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Although financial innovations and deregulations are often argued to be one of the main 
causes of the current global financial crises, there are only a few cross-country empirical 
evidences. Using several proxy variables for different types of innovations and regulations of 
a total of 132 countries, this thesis analyzes the effects of various types of financial 
innovations and regulations on several types of financial crisis such as currency crisis and 
banking crisis, for countries with different income levels. The thesis shows that financial 
innovation in the form of securitization has a negative effect on a country’s financial stability, 
while stronger regulations in the form of restrictions on bank activities and entry 
requirements are positively associated with the financial stability. However, judicious 
implementation of financial regulations is required to cope with the financial crisis because 
some types of regulations, if implemented simultaneously, have countervailing effects and 
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The current global financial crisis which started in 2007 has not ameliorated and continued to 
affect many countries. Housing bubble and credit boom are commonly attributed to the 
collapse of financial institutions around the world. As of 2010, for example, several countries 
such as Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain are still struggling with their sovereign 
debt crises. However, the degree of impacts of these crises varies by countries, and an 
important policy concern is to point out the factors that affect the extent and frequency of 
financial crisis. 
Many studies argue that hyperactive financial innovations and the trend of deregulation 
on the financial sector are the main causes of the current financial crisis. Like the case of 
portfolio insurance in the 1987 Black Monday financial crisis and derivatives in the 1998 
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis, some studies attribute the current crisis to 
the financial innovations such as collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
1
 and credit default 
swap (CDS).
2
 Several studies argue that securitization such as CDO caused credit boom and 
asset bubble, leading to financial crisis due to lax screening (Keys et al. 2010) or  frictions in 
the securitization process (Ashcraft and Schuermann 2008), and that derivatives led to 
                                                 
1
 Collateralized debt obligation is a structured credit security backed by a pool of credit-sensitive assets, where 
the interests in the security are divided into tranches with differing repayment and interest earning streams. The 
reference pool of assets typically includes a diverse range of assets, such as senior secured bank loans, high-
yield bonds, and credit default swaps (IMF 2009d). 
2
 Credit default swap is a credit derivative whose payout is triggered by default. CDS settlements can either be 
“physical” in which the protection seller buys a defaulted reference asset from the protection buyer at its face 
value or “cash” in which the protection seller pays the protection buyer an amount equal to the difference 
between the reference asset face value and the price of the defaulted asset (IMF 2009d).  
 
 2 
systemic financial risk (Dodd 2000) and risk contagion (Allen and Carletti 2006). In addition, 
the regulation and supervisory systems in many countries fail to keep up with the rapidly 
evolving financial industry. Eichengreen and Portes (1987) argue that regulations of financial 
innovations can make economy less vulnerable to financial collapse, though the benefits of 
deregulation are apparent. On the other hand, Barth et al. (2006) show that restrictions on 
bank activities have contributed to financial crises in many countries. 
The objective of this thesis is to examine (i) whether financial innovations have 
contributed to the current financial crisis, (ii) whether deregulation has intensified the crisis, 
and (iii) which combinations of regulations have exacerbated the crisis. Though a number of 
countries are reforming their regulatory systems to redress the imbalance between financial 
innovation and regulations (Financial Services Authority 2009, Department of Treasury 
2009), there is lack of empirical studies to answer these questions with cross-country 
database. Most existing studies examine the issue of innovations, regulations and financial 
crises with the cases of the United States or a small region (Dodd 2000, Ashcraft and 
Schuermann 2008, Brunnermeier 2009). However, the innovation or regulatory systems of a 
country do not change much in a short term, and it is difficult to generalize the results of 
existing studies in a global context. With the global data of 132 countries which exhibit a 
wide variety of innovations or regulatory systems, this thesis can provide more generalized 
implications of innovation and regulation.  
The main contributions of this thesis are the followings. First, it considers both 
currency crisis and banking crisis separately and measures these variables as a count variable 
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instead of a binary variable considered in most existing studies (Lestano et al. 2003, Beck et 
al. 2006, Barth et al. 2008a). Second, it categorizes the 132 countries into high income and 
low income countries, and compares the effects of each factor under different market 
environments. Third, it considers various types of financial regulations and analyzes the 
effects of specific combination of regulatory measures on the degree of financial crisis.  
The organization of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on 
the relation between financial crises and financial innovations or regulations. Chapter 3 lists 
several testable hypotheses drawn from the literature review. Chapter 4 describes the source 
of data, the definitions of each variable, and its summary statistics. Chapter 5 examines the 








2.1 Financial Crisis  
2.1.1 Types of financial crisis 
Modern financial crises are characterized by their global scale in which a crisis in one 
country is quickly transmitted to other countries. For example, the Mexican debt crisis in 
1982, the Thailand currency crisis in 1997, and the Russian debt crisis in 1998 were all 
rapidly transmitted to other countries and caused global financial crises (Kaminsky et al. 
2005). Several studies examine various factors that affect the financial crises and regulatory 
measures that can prevent or lessen the crisis (Morris and Shin 1998, Georgievska et al. 2008, 
Reinhart and Rogoff 2008a).  
A few types of financial crisis have been defined depending on the focus of research. 
Allen and Snyder (2009) define financial crisis as a state of a wider range of disturbances in 
financial sectors, such as sharp declines in asset prices, failures of large financial 
intermediaries, or disruption in foreign exchange markets. Hoffman et al. (2007) define 
financial crisis as a situation where a large number of financial contracts are suddenly broken. 
In most literatures, financial crisis is broadly classified into three types: banking crisis, 
currency crisis, and debt crisis (Jacobs et al. 2005, Laeven and Valencia 2008).   
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Banking crisis refers to the situation where banks and financial sectors face difficulties 
in repaying contracts on time and experience a large number of defaults. A few specific 
events are used in identifying the banking crisis, such as bank runs, forced bank closures, 
mergers, and government intervention (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999, Reinhart and Rogoff 
2008b). In addition, quantitative thresholds are also applied in its identification, such as the 
ratio of nonperforming assets to total bank assets (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1997) 
and the ratio of holding deposit to total deposit (Dziobek and Pazarbasioglu 1997). After the 
global financial liberalization in the 1970s, banking crises have been observed all over the 
world: in the United States in 1984, in the Nordic countries in 1980s, in Japan and Eastern 
European countries in 1990s, and in Argentina and Uruguay in early 2000s. 
A few explanations on the causes of banking crises are suggested in several studies. 
Based on the data of 18 banking crises of several countries from the postwar period, Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2008a) argue that financial liberalization, run-up of asset prices, debt 
accumulation, growth patterns, and current account deficits are the likely causes of all 
sampled banking crises. Honohan and Laeven (2005) explain that fluctuations in inflation 
and exchange rate are the most important causes of instable banking system in the 1970s. In 
addition, greater ownership and involvement of government in the banking system in many 
developing countries in 1960s and 1970s have resulted in insecure credit and higher 
nonperforming loans. Bubbles in credit and asset often lead to systemic banking crises 
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2008b). 
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Currency crisis is typically defined as large changes in certain indices of actual or 
potential currency value. Defining an appropriate index has been the focus of debates. Some 
studies focus on the size of depreciation (Frankel and Rose 1996), while others include 
speculative pressure and government intervention (Eichengreen et al. 1995, Kaminsky and 
Reinhart 1999). The 1997 Asian crisis was a typical example of currency crisis, in which 
some governments stopped defending their currencies after continuous pressure associated 
with high economic growth (Allen and Gale 2007). The potential causes of currency crisis 
include weak banking sector (Obstfeld 1994), bank run (Velasco 1987), and asymmetric 
information about fundamentals (Morris and Shin 1998). 
Debt crisis refers to the situation where a country is in default on its sovereign bonds, 
and is observed by the presence of a debt rescheduling agreement or negotiation, unpaid 
principal repayment or interest, and an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan agreement 
(Lestano et al. 2003). Some studies use the combination of these events as a measure of debt 
crisis (Hajivassiliou 1994, Detragiache and Spilimbergo 2001), while others use a single 
indicator as its measure (Lanoie and Lemarbre 1996, Marchesi 2003). The 1997 Asian crisis 
had the features of debt crisis, and the default of syndicated bank debts in early 1980s by 
several Latin American and African countries was also an example of debt crisis 
(Detragiache and Spilimbergo 2001). The factors that affect the likelihood of debt crisis 
include increases in the proportion of short-term debt and debt service coming due, decrease 
in foreign exchange reserves, the exchange rate policy which affects a country’s solvency, 
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financial openness, high inflation and illiquidity as well as political factors (Detragiache and 
Spilimbergo 2001, Georgievska et al. 2008). 
Last few decades observed numerous incidences of financial crises around the world. 
Banking crises were most frequently observed during the early 1990s, reaching their peak in 
1995 with 13 banking crises. Several currency crises also happened during the same period, 
though they were more prevalent in the 1980s with a maximum of 45 occurrences in 1981. 
Debt crises mostly happened in the early 1980s with a maximum of 10 crises in 1983. 
Laeven and Valencia (2008) report that a total of 124 banking crises, 208 currency crises and 
63 debt crises were observed globally during the period of 1970 to 2007. Both banking and 
currency crises were occurred simultaneously in 42 cases, and all three types of crisis were 
reported in 10 cases. However, the number of these crises is sensitive to the definition of 
financial crises, and a single definition cannot encompass all aspects of crises due to their 
interdependence (Allen and Gale 2007). 
2.1.2 Current Financial Crisis 
The current financial crisis in the late 2000s is rarely studied, mainly due to the ongoing 
nature of the crisis and the lack of available data. However, a few anecdotal studies report 
that the current crisis is preceded by low real interest rate, credit boom, and rise in asset 
prices (BIS 2009, Taylor 2009, World Bank 2009b). Low interest rates and excessive savings 
in early 2000s have precipitated investments in housing market in developed countries. As 
the housing prices dropped in 2006 due to tightening credit and negative expectation of 
housing price, disturbances in subprime mortgage industry have started from June 2007. 
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Then, asset prices decreased after large losses on subprime mortgage assets and the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Uncertainty about economic outlook hit the global financial 
market, and governments intervened through nationalization and temporary guarantee of 
money market funds since March 2008. Though a few optimistic signs, such as decreased 
volatilities and recovering of asset prices, have been observed since March 2009, the 
macroeconomic indicators still show negative signs. For instance, Libor-OIS spread which 
indicates the soundness of banking sector and forward rate which measures the investors’ 
expectations still remain negative (BIS 2009).      
Financial innovations in many countries might have precipitated the current crisis. 
Financial innovations, such as securitized instruments and structured financial products, 
facilitated the asset boom and led to a sharp increase in leverage throughout major financial 
systems (World Bank 2009b). The crisis is conspicuous in the United States due to its 
hyperactive innovations. Financial liberalization or deregulation also had a role in the crisis. 
Regulators failed to control the high leverage in financial sectors and could not detect the 
risks of banks’ capital positions. Shadow banking system, engaged in a number of maturity 
transformations such as long-term lending with short-term borrowing through off-balance-
sheet transactions, was not subjected to the same level of scrutiny as deposit-holding 
institutions, and regulators relied on banks’ own evaluation of capital positions (World Bank 
2009b).  
The current crisis is similar to past banking crises in which the banking industry was 
vulnerable to the problems in the mortgage market (Allen et al. 2009). With a large volume 
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of mortgage-backed securities and risky short-term loans, banks were directly hit from the 
mortgage crisis. In addition, the current crisis synchronizes globally due to worldwide 
financial contagion; the 12-month average correlation of G-20 equity prices was 0.44 before 
the crisis, but now 0.92 after the crisis (IMF 2009b). 
2.2 Factors Affecting Financial Crises 
As discussed in the previous sections, bubbles in credit and asset, financial liberalization, 
debt accumulation, and current account deficits are common factors leading to the banking 
crisis, while weak banking sector, bank run, and asymmetric information about fundamentals 
are potential causes of the currency crisis. The exchange rate policy, financial openness, high 
inflation and illiquidity, and political factors are believed to affect the likelihood of the debt 
crisis. However, both financial innovations and regulatory measures are considered the most 
important factors that affect each type of financial crisis.  
2.2.1 Financial Innovation  
Financial innovation refers to the act of creating and implementing new financial instruments 
as well as new financial technologies, institutions, and markets. The innovations are often 
observed as products such as new derivatives and new securities or processes such as new 
means of distributing securities, new processing transactions, and new pricing transactions 
(Tufano 2003). Although financial innovation is often associated with the occurrence of 
financial crisis, few studies examine this relation due to obscure definition of financial 
innovation and lack of available data (Frame and White 2004). Financial service firms do not 
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have separate R&D budget, and there are no observable measures of financial innovation 
such as patents.  
However, a few recent studies try to shed light on the relation between financial 
innovation and crisis. Brunnermeier (2009) claims that while financial innovation has made 
banking system stable by transferring risks, it has led to an unprecedented credit expansion 
and housing price bubble. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) argue that financial innovation is a 
strong indicator of a bubble. Extensive use of securitization has resulted in interconnected 
obligations and increased systemic risk. Several studies argue that financial innovations, such 
as credit default swaps, securitizations, and derivatives, have contributed risk contagion 
(Allen and Carletti 2006, Ashcraft and Schuermann 2008, Keys et al. 2010). On the other 
hand, other studies argue that securitization by itself may not enhance financial stability, but 
it helps cushion the immediate impact of interest rate shocks to loan origination (Goswami et 
al. 2009, Shin 2009).  
2.2.2 Regulation  
Financial regulations are implemented in most countries to secure financial stability and to 
prevent systemic financial risk. Prudent financial regulation and supervision are considered 
essential in banking industry since consumers cannot monitor banks’ complexity of financial 
products effectively (Dewatripont and Tirole 1994). However, the fragility of financial 
market can be originated from inconsistent government policy which hampers the effective 
regulations and supervisions and leads to financial crisis (Caprio et al. 2008). 
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Different views about the role of financial regulation (or deregulation) in the current 
crisis are suggested. Some point out the economic benefits of deregulation in financial sector 
and argue that deregulation is not the cause of the recent crisis (Kaminsky and Schmukler 
2003, Wallison 2009). Others support the importance of stringent regulation and supervision 
in preventing financial crisis (Skott 1996). In the empirical analysis, Beck et al. (2006) find 
that overall restrictions on bank activities have a negative effect on the financial stability, 
while Barth et al. (2004 and 2008a) find that regulation on diversification is positively 
associated with the financial stability with cross-country data. 
Three types of financial regulations−capital regulation, official supervisory power, and 
private monitoring−are often discussed in existing studies because they are consistent with 
the three pillars of the Basel II Accord (Petersen et al. 2009).
3
 Gordy and Howells (2006) 
argue that the Accord reduces the financial stability since capital requirements under the 
Accord will increase in bust and fall in boom. On the other hand, Barth et al. (2008a) 
categorize 7 regulatory indices including the three pillars of the Accord: overall restrictions 
on bank activities, entry requirements, diversification, capital regulation, private monitoring, 
government-owned banks, and official supervisory power. The extended indices are worth 
considering since particular regulatory combinations can have different effects on financial 
stability. However, the effects of each element of the indices on containing financial crisis 
are controversial. 
                                                 
3
 The Basel II Accord is a list of recommendations on banking laws and regulations, issued by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. The Accord consists of three pillars: a regulatory standard for minimum 
capital requirements (pillar 1), the supervisory review process (pillar 2), and market discipline (pillar 3). 
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  Overall restrictions on bank activities: Some studies argue that stringent 
restrictions on bank activities exacerbate bank fragility and that there was no 
evidence about the conflict of interest in universal banking, such as operating both 
commercial and investment banking activities, before the Glass-Steagall Act 
(Kroszner and Rajan 1994, Barth et al. 2008a).
4
 Others argue that tightened 
restrictions on bank activities contribute the soundness of banking industry through 
banks’ moral hazard problems and conflicting interests (John et al. 1994, Boyd et al. 
1998). 
 Entry requirements: Some insist that strict entry requirements to banking sector 
hamper efficient competition and negatively affect the economy (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1998), while others argue that big hurdle for the entry prompts the 
soundness of banking industry (Keeley 1990). 
 Regulation of diversification: Some argue that banks with greater diversification are 
exposed to currency risk and various country risks (Stigum 1990), while others find 
that greater diversification has a positive effect on bank stability (Buch et al. 2004, 
Barth et al. 2006).  
 Capital regulations: Some claim that tightened capital regulation cannot maintain 
bank stability (Allen and Gale 2003, Barth et al. 2008a), while others argue that 
                                                 
4




strong capital regulations enhance the financial stability by protecting the financial 
system from bank runs (Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, Berger et al. 1995).  
 Private monitoring: Some argue that there is no significant relation between the 
private monitoring and the likelihood of financial crisis (Barth et al. 2008a), while 
others claim that the private monitoring is more important than government 
regulations because politicians can be affected by big bank conglomerates (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1998). 
 Government ownership of banks: Some claim that government-owned banks are 
likely to exploit their assets for political purpose and increase the likelihood of the 
banking crisis (Carprio and Peria 2006), while others argue that government 
ownership enhances the stability of financial sector through strategic plan and 
avoidance of market failure and negative externality (Gerschenkron 1962). 
 Official supervisory power: Some find no significant relation between official 
supervisory power and the crisis (Barth et al. 2006), while others argue that strong 
official supervisory power prevents the economy from market failures (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1998).  
There may be countervailing or amplifying effects between various elements of 
regulations, if implemented simultaneously (Claessens et al. 2005). Greater restrictions on 
bank activities can be essential in countries with insufficient private monitoring, whereas 






To analyze the factors that affect the financial crisis, this chapter summarizes the testable 
hypotheses based on the existing literature.  
Hypothesis 1: Securitization as a form of financial innovation has a positive effect on 
banking crisis.  
While financial innovation has been believed to enhance the financial stability, it is now 
blamed for one of the main causes of the current crisis. Few studies examine the relation 
between financial innovation and financial crisis with cross-country data on a global scale; 
existing studies focus on the experiences of a single country or a group of a few countries. 
With the current crisis of the United States, Brunnermeier (2009) explains that financial 
innovations such as the “originate and distribute” model led to the financial crisis through 
lending boom and housing bubble. Under the “originate and distribute” model, financial 
institutions originate loans such as mortgages, repackage them into securitized products, and 
then sell via securitization such as CDOs. Large foreign capital flows to the market, but 
banks have less incentive to take care of the loan applications and monitor the loans because 
the risks of holding the loans pass on to investors. Similarly, Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) 
show that the intrinsic frictions (e.g., moral hazard, adverse selection, and principal-agent 
problems) from the securitization process have caused the subprime mortgage crisis in the 
United States.  
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Derivatives, another form of financial innovation, are believed to allow firms and 
banks to effectively manage their financial risks at low a cost (Miller 1995). However, 
derivatives are now attributed to much of the financial turmoil, especially the East Asian 
currency crisis of 1997. With the data on the over-the-counter derivatives markets such as 
foreign exchange forwards and swaps, total return swap, and structured notes, Dodd (2000) 
shows that derivatives increase the systemic financial risk by leveraging, evading regulation, 
and making the foreign exchange market less stable.  
Studies on the relation between the venture capital and financial stability are modest. 
Some argue that inside investors such as the venture capital and private equity reduce the 
cost of asymmetric information and resolve diverse agency problem in financial sector 
(Admati and Pfleiderer 1994, Amit et al. 1998). In sum, most financial innovations are 
expected to have a positive effect on both currency and banking crisis regardless of the 
income level of a country, even though a few innovations such as the venture capital are 
believed to reduce the financial fragility. 
Hypothesis 2: Among financial regulations, the restrictions on bank activities and the 
entry requirements have negative effects on banking crisis in high income countries.  
After the onset of the current crisis, financial liberalization or deregulation were regarded as 
the main causes of the crisis, and a number of governments tried to reform their financial 
regulation more tightly. The role of financial regulation in the financial crisis is heavily 
debated and no conclusive result has yet agreed upon. Barth et al. (2004) show that 
restrictions on bank activities and entry barriers to foreign bank have positive effects on 
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banking crisis, and the same conclusion is derived by Beck et al. (2006) with the data on 69 
countries over the period 1980-1997. 
However, both studies have a few shortcomings: (i) they focus only on banking crises, 
though currency crises or debt crises are considered more important in some major financial 
crises, (ii) with the data of about 50 – 70 countries, they cannot study the differences in the 
relation among countries with diverse income level, (iii) their use of binary variable of 
financial crisis prevents them from analyzing the effects of depth or frequency of the crises, 
(iv) they use limited number of control variables, while many other macroeconomic variables 
are significant in the financial crises, and (v) they suffer from the problem of reverse 
causation because they use the crises data between 1980s and 1990s with the regulation data 
from 1999. Among the seven regulatory variables, this thesis focuses on two regulation 
variables: overall restrictions on bank activities and entry requirements. The problem of 
reverse causation is resolved by collecting the regulatory data from 2006 and the crisis data 
between January 2007 and October 2009.  
Hypothesis 3: The restrictions on bank activities with the private monitoring have a 
countervailing effect on banking crisis in high income countries. 
Some regulatory combinations can enhance financial stability under particular regulatory 
environment, but increase the fragility under other environments. However, few studies 
examine the effects of regulatory combinations, except Barth et al. (2004). Barth et al. 
examine several regulatory combinations which are believed to have countervailing or 
amplifying effect due to different individual objectives. To analyze whether particular 
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regulation is associated with stability in specific condition, Barth et al. enter interaction terms 
into regressions; however, they do not find any significance in the interaction terms. Among 
Barth et al.’s combinations, I focus on the regulatory combination of the restrictions on bank 
activities and the private monitoring. Some argue that restricting bank activities is more 
important in weak institutional environments where the public sector lacks the ability to 
monitor banks (Barth et al. 2004). Barth et al. (2004) examine this argument using the 
interaction term but do not find any result supporting this contention. In the study, I add the 
interaction term (private monitoring) * (overall restrictions on bank activities) into every 
regression models on both types of crisis for all types of country groups to test the 










IMF (2009c) presents the timeline of the recent financial crises in advanced and emerging 
economies from 2007 till 2009 (Figure 1). The timeline consists of the TED spread, which 
refers to the difference between U.S. Treasury bill rate and Eurodollar rate, and the Emerging 
Market Bond Index (EMBI) global spread. The EMBI global spread stands for an index of 
default risk relative to advanced benchmark countries and is usually computed as the 
difference between the yield on a bond in the market access country and that on a bond of 
comparable maturity in the benchmark country. Two spreads in Figure 1 show the 
development of the crisis with some key events. Figure 2 presents the number of extensive 
liquidity supports, which refers to a big increase in claims from monetary authorities on 
deposit-holding banks, during the same period. Both figures exhibit very similar trend of 
financial crises and especially a peak in November 2008 with the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers.  
The comparison between two figures clearly shows that the current crisis is mainly 
banking crisis since the extensive liquidity support is one of the indicators for banking crises. 
The figures also present that emerging market or other low income countries had not been 
closely associated with advanced economies until Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 
2008, but that Lehman’s bankruptcy triggered global crisis. This chapter discusses the 




4.1 Dependent Variable: Financial Crisis  
This section explains the data sources and the method of calculating each type of financial 
crisis (currency crisis, banking crisis, and debt crisis). Instead of adopting binary variable 
which describes the existence of financial crisis, this study creates the financial crisis 
variables which capture the number of crises in each country. 
4.1.1 Currency Crisis 
Some define a currency crisis as a nominal depreciation of the currency of 30 percent or a 10 
percent increase in the rate of depreciation compared to the year before (Laeven and Valencia 
2008). Eichengreen et al. (1995 and 1996) calculate the exchange rate market pressure index 
(EMPI) for different market environments, and identify the currency crisis if the EMPI 
exceeds a certain threshold. Several studies propose alternative ways of calculating the EMPI, 
by excluding interest rate differentials (Kaminsky et al. 1998), international reserves and 
interest rate differentials (Frankel and Rose 1996), or interest rate variables and the link to 
the reference country (Zhang 2001). However, Eichengreen et al.’s method is considered 
more accurate because it can capture both successful and unsuccessful speculative attacks 
and outperforms the other models in the experiment using the crises data of six Asian 
countries from 1970 to 2001 (Lestano et al. 2003).  
A speculative attack associated with extreme pressure in the foreign exchange market 
often results in a devaluation (or revaluation) or a change in the exchange rate system. If the 
government raises the interest rate or run down the international reserve, the speculative 
attack may not affect the exchange rates. Thus, the speculative pressure (or currency crisis) is 
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explained as exchange rate market pressure index (EMPI) which is measured as a weighted 
average of the normalized changes in the exchange rate, the ratio of gross international 
reserves to M1, and the nominal interest rates (Eichengreen et al. 1995 and 1996).  
  =    , 
where EMPIi,t is the exchange rate market pressure index for country i in period t; ei,t is the 
unit of country i’s currency per Norway krone in period t; rmi,t is the ratio of gross foreign 
reserves to M1−a measure of money supply consisting of currency in circulation, demand 
deposit, and checkable deposit−for country i in period t; ii,t is the nominal interest rates for 
country i in period t; iNR,t is the nominal interest rates for Norway in period t; σe is the 
standard deviation of the relative change in the exchange rate (∆ei,t/ei,t); σr is the standard 
deviation of the difference between the relative changes in the ratio of foreign reserves and 
money (M1) in country i and Norway ((∆rmi,t/rmi,t)−(∆rmNR,t/rmNR,t)); and σi the standard 
deviation of the nominal interest rate differential ∆(ii,t−iNR,t). 
All variables in the above index are measured relative to a reference country, and 
Lestano et al. (2003) use the United States as their reference country due to the dollar’s role 
as an anchor to other currencies. However, this study uses Norway as the reference country 
because the United States is the centre of the current global crisis and its currency is not 
stable, while the Norwegian krone is considered one of the safest currencies (Smith 2009). In 
addition, a big surge of U.S. international reserve in July 2009 may bias the timing of the 
currency crisis of other countries. Eichengreen et al. used Germany as the reference country 
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because German mark was strong and stable at the time of their study. This index captures 
the changes in domestic exchange rate if the speculative attack is successful, and captures the 
changes in international reserves or nominal interest rates if the attack does not lead to 
devaluation. A period of speculative attack or currency crisis is identified when the index 
exceeds a given upper bound: 
  
where  equals the sample standard deviation of EMPI and is the sample mean of 
EMPIi,t. This study sets a threshold of β = 2 based on Lestano et al. (2003).  
The global data (e.g., exchange rate, gross foreign reserve, M1, and interest rate) in the 
EMPI are obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of IMF during the period 
from January 2007 to October 2009 (see Table 1). I calculate the sum of the number of 
months for the count outcomes if the currency crisis is one in the given month.   
4.1.2 Banking Crisis 
Banking crises are identified with several observable measures, such as bank runs, increase 
in nonperforming assets, emergency measures by monetary authorities, and bank 
nationalizations. Following Laeven and Valencia (2008), this study measures the banking 
crisis with bank runs, introduction of deposit freezes, introduction of blanket guarantees, 
extensive liquidity support, and bank interventions. Bank run is identified if the monthly 
percentage decline in the total deposits with national currencies is larger than 5%. Deposit 
freeze indicates whether the authorities imposed a freeze on deposits, and blanket guarantee 
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is the government guarantee on all bank liabilities. Extensive liquidity support is defined if 
the ratio of claims on deposit-holding institutions to total deposits is larger than 5% and is at 
least double the ratio compared to the previous year.
5
 Large-scale government interventions 
include nationalizations, closures, mergers, sales, and recapitalizations of large banks.  
In addition to the above measures, this study includes the Stand-By Arrangement 
(SBA) loans from IMF, which are designed to help the short-term balance of payments 
problems. SBA loans are considered as clear evidences that the country is suffering from 
banking crisis. According to IMF (2009c), several fund-supported programs based on the 
SBA loans are being implemented to avoid systemic banking crises or restore bank solvency 
if a country is faced with banking crisis.  
Both quantitative thresholds (bank runs and extensive liquidity support) and 
chronologies of events (deposit freezes, blanket guarantees, bank interventions, and SBA 
loans) are used to identify the banking crisis during the period of January 2007 to October 
2009. The number of bank runs and extensive liquidity support in each country are counted 
using the monthly data on total deposits and claims on deposit-holding banks from the IFS. 
Regarding deposit freezes, blanket guarantees, and SBA loans, I do not calculate a 
summation since each action is taken at most once in a country. The event of each bank 
intervention is counted for each country. The count measure of banking crisis for each 
country is the summation of the number of occurrences of each index.  
                                                 
5
 Both extensive liquidity support and blanket guarantees are two commonly used crisis containment measures 
by the government (Laeven and Valencia 2008). 
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4.1.3 Debt Crisis 
Debt crisis is identified if either of the following conditions occur (Detragiache and 
Spilimbergo 2001): (i) arrears of principal or interest on external obligations toward 
commercial creditors (banks or bondholders) exceed 5 percent of the total outstanding 
commercial debt and (ii) a rescheduling or debt restructuring agreement with commercial 
creditors exists as listed in the World Bank’s Global Development Finance. Debt crisis is 
counted as 1 if a country experiences a rescheduling or a debt restructuring. Since only seven 
countries
6
 have experienced at most one debt crisis during the study period, this measure is 
not examined in this empirical analysis.  
4.2 Independent Variables 
4.2.1 Financial Innovation  
While the changes in M1 or M2 were often used as a proxy for financial innovation (Arrau et 
al. 1991, Aubry and Nott 1999), recent studies measure financial innovation with 
securitization and risk transfer instruments (Tufano 2003).
7
 Following Gropp et al. (2007), 
this study considers three indicators as proxy for financial innovations: securitization and 
issuance of covered bonds, turnover in single-currency interest rate derivatives, and venture 
capital investments, and all variables are transformed as a percentage of GDP. 
                                                 
6
 Togo, Gabon, Jordan, Congo, Peru, Central African Republic, and Macedonia. 
7
 M1 is a measure of money supply consisting of currency in circulation, demand deposit, and checkable deposit, 
and M2 is a measure of money supply consisting of M1, savings deposits, and timing deposits. 
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For securitization, which refers to the creation of securities from a reference portfolio 
of preexisting assets or future receivable, the data for 45 countries are collected from the 
European Securitization Forum (2008), International Finance Services London (2009), 
Deutsche Bank (2007), and International Finance Corporation (2008). The collected sample 
countries cover most of issuances according to the International Financial Services London 
(2009).  
The turnover in single-currency interest rate derivatives is the representation of 
derivatives because the interest rate derivatives market was the largest in 2005 and 2006 
(International Swaps and Derivatives Association 2007). This data is collected from BIS 
(2007) under “The over-the-counter single currency interest rate derivatives turnover by 
country and counterparty in April 2007, daily average.” This dataset covers only 54 
countries, and the turnovers for the rest of countries are assumed zero because the derivatives 
market is still not common in many of the non-sampled countries. 
Venture capital covers the early stage venture capital and private equity for 
management buy-outs and buy-ins (Wright et al. 2005). The data for 22 countries, which 
covers over 91 percent of the global venture capital investment, are collected from Price-
waterhouseCoopers (2008), Latin America Venture Capital Association (2008), British 
Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (2008), European Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association (2008), Emerging Markets Private Equity Association (2009), Israel 
Venture Capital Research Center (2008), and PRNewswire (2008). 
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4.2.2 Regulatory and Supervisory Variables  
Barth et al. (2008a) implemented a survey on bank regulation and supervision for 143 
countries during 2005 – 2006. To construct the regulation-related variables from the survey, I 
focus on seven indices. For missing values of a few countries, I either use the 2000/2003 data 
or calculate the average value of countries with the same income level in the same region.  
(a) Overall restrictions on bank activities: This index measures the extent to which 
banks have regulatory restrictions on their activities in (1) securities markets, (2) insurance, 
(3) real estate, and (4) having shares in non-financial companies. The values in each of the 
four class range from 0 to 4, and the index varies from 0 to 16, where the index of 16 
indicates the most restrictive regulation on bank activities.  
(b) Entry requirements: This index counts the number of requirements for a banking 
license: (1) draft by-laws, (2) intended organizational chart, (3) financial projections for first 
3 years, (4) financial information on main potential shareholders, (5) background/experience 
of future directors, (6) background/experience of future managers, (7) sources of funds to be 
used to capitalize the new bank, and (8) market differentiation intended for the new bank. 
The index ranges from 0 to 8, and a larger value implies a higher hurdle for entrants. 
(c) Diversification: This index measures whether there exist explicit, verifiable, 
quantifiable guidelines for asset diversification, and banks are allowed to make loans abroad. 
The index is made up of two questions: (1) Are there explicit, verifiable, quantifiable 
guidelines for asset diversification? (2) Are banks prohibited from making loans abroad? 
Higher values indicate more diversification. 
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(d) Capital regulation: This index estimates the overall and initial capital stringency, 
and consists 9 questions: (1) Is the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement risk weighted in 
line with the Basel guidelines? (2) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk? 
(3) Are market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books deducted? (4) Are 
unrealized losses in securities portfolios deducted? (5) Are unrealized foreign exchange 
losses deducted? (6) What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital? (7) Are 
the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? 
(8) Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other 
than cash or government securities? (9) Can initial disbursement of capital be done with 
borrowed funds? The index ranges from 0 to 9, and higher value indicates more restrictive 
regulation.  
(e) Private monitoring: This index measures the degree to which regulations empower, 
facilitate, and encourage the private sector to monitor banks. It consists of the questions 
about whether (1) bank directors and officials are legally liable for the accuracy of 
information disclosed to the public, (2) whether banks must publish consolidated accounts, (3) 
whether banks must be audited by certified international auditors, (4) whether 100% of the 
largest 10 banks are rated by international rating agencies, (5) whether off-balance sheet 
items are disclosed to the public, (6) whether banks must disclose their risk management 
procedures to the public, (7) whether accrued, though unpaid interest/principal, enter the 
income statement, while the loan is still non-performing, (8) whether subordinated debt is 
allowable as part of capital, and (9) whether there is no explicit deposit insurance system and 
 
 27 
no insurance was paid the last time a bank failed. The index varies from 0 to 9, and larger 
value implies more stringent regulation on private monitoring of banks. 
(f) Government-owned banks: This index measures the extent to which the banking 
system’s assets are government owned. The index consists of only one question; what 
fraction of the banking system's assets is in banks that are 50% or more government owned 
as of yearend 2005? The index ranges from 0 to 1, and larger value implies greater 
government ownership in banking industry. 
(g) Official supervisory power: This index measures the extent to which the country’s 
commercial bank supervisory agency has the authority to take specific actions. It consists of 
the information on (1) Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external 
auditors about banks? (2) Are auditors required to communicate directly to the supervisory 
agency about elicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? (3) Can supervisors take legal action 
against external auditors for negligence? (4) Can the supervisory authority force a bank to 
change its internal organizational structure? (5) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to 
supervisors? (6) Can the supervisory agency order the bank’s directors or management to 
constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? (7) Can the supervisory agency 
suspend the directors’ decision to distribute (a) dividends, (b) bonuses, and (c) management 
fees? (8) Can the supervisory agency supersede the rights of bank shareholders and declare a 
bank insolvent? (9) Can the supervisory agency suspend some or all ownership rights? (10) 
Can the supervisory agency (a) supersede shareholder rights, (b) remove and replace 
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management, and (c) remove and replace directors? The index ranges from 0 to 14, and 
larger value means greater power.  
4.2.3 Other Control Variables 
4.2.3.1 Financial Structure 
While some countries have bank-based financial structure, others have market-based one. For 
the countries with the bank-based financial structure such as Japan and Germany, banks are 
considered to enhance the capital allocation with detailed information about firms, increase 
the investment efficiency and economic growth through liquidity risk management, and 
mobilize more capital for economies of scale. However, corruption is likely to happen for 
powerful banks with lax government regulations. On the other hand, for the countries with 
the market-based structure such as the United Kingdom and the United States, market is 
regarded to foster incentives to monitor firms, to improve corporate governance, and to 
facilitate risk management. However, greater market development may hinder corporate 
control and economic growth due to fewer incentives to exert corporate control (Levine 
2002). Countries with a particular financial structure can be more vulnerable to financial 
crisis, and thus the financial structure difference has to be controlled in the regression 
analysis.  
Beck et al. (2009) provide a database on the indicators of financial structure for each 
country. For missing data, this study uses previous database, collects other sources such as 
central banks or monetary authorities, or substitutes the data from countries in the same 
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region with the same income level. The financial structure indicators are composed of the 
activity, size, and efficiency. As a first step, four measures are calculated based on Beck et 
al.’s method: (1) private credit by deposit money banks/GDP, (2) bank overhead costs/total 
assets, (3) stock market capitalization/GDP, and (4) stock market total value traded/GDP. 
Then, each indicator is computed by natural logarithm of following ratios: the measure (4) to 
the measure (1) for the activity indicator, the measure (3) to the measure (1) for the size 
indicator, and the measure (4) to the measure (2) for the efficiency indicator. Higher value in 
each indicator implies more market-based financial structure. To reduce the number of 
variables, I construct an aggregate index of financial structure using the factor analysis.  
4.2.3.2 Other Macroeconomic Variables  
Macroeconomic variables of a country are generally considered to have close relation with its 
financial stability. This study includes, as control variables, the 12-month percentage changes 
in M1 and M2, commercial bank deposits, GDP per capita, and national savings in the period 
of 2005 to 2006, because these five macroeconomic variables are related to the three types of 
financial crises (Lestano et al. 2003). These data are collected from the IFS, the central banks, 
and statistic authorities of each country.  
4.3 Summary Statistics  
Summary statistics of all variables are presented in Table 2. For currency crisis, Cyprus, Fiji, 
and Moldova have experienced serious crises most often during the study period. For 
banking crisis, Greece experienced most crises, followed by Russian Federation and Ireland. 
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With regard to debt crisis, only seven countries (Togo, Gabon, Jordan, Congo, Peru, Central 
African Republic, and Macedonia) have experienced it. While Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
argue that currency and banking crises are closely associated each other, the data on the 
recent financial crisis do not show any relation between them. 
Table 3 shows the correlations among independent variables at the 0.05 significant 
level. Three innovation variables are positively correlated with each others, while the private 
monitoring and the aggregate index of the financial structure has positive correlations with 
all types of financial innovation. The overall restrictions on bank activities are positively 
correlated with the government-owned banks and the official supervisory power, and 
negatively correlated with the diversification. Table 3 also illustrates that the government 






With a count variable as the dependent variable of financial crisis, either negative binomial 
or Poisson regression model is employed for estimation. To verify whether the assumptions 
of each model are satisfied, I first transform the relevant variables. With various tools for 
normality such as a symmetry plot, a normal quantile plot, and a normal probability plot, I 
transformed the overall restrictions on bank activities variable, the private monitoring 
variable, and the official supervisory power variable by square function, the government 
ownership variable and the GDP per capita variable by square root function, and the 
commercial bank deposit variable by reciprocal function (Garson 2010). To control for 
heteroskedasticity, I apply robust standard errors to all regressions. The multicollinearity 
problem is tested using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), in which further investigation is 
required if a VIF value is greater than 10. All variables in this study have VIF values less 
than 7, and there is no multicollinearity problem. 
Two variables of financial crisis are separately estimated as a dependent variable: 
currency crisis and banking crisis. With three groupings of country (all countries, high 
income countries, and low income countries), a total of 6 separate regression models are 
estimated. Based on the World Bank classification (World Bank 2009c), high income 
countries include both high income and upper middle income countries with a total of 76 
countries, and low income countries cover both lower middle and low income countries with 
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a total of 56 countries in our sample. Since the Poisson regression model assumes that 
standard deviation is equal to the mean, I instead use the negative binomial model. Three 
types of innovation variables and all seven regulation variables are applied in each regression 
model.  
5.1 Effects of Financial Innovation on Financial Crisis 
To test the relation between financial innovation and crisis, I estimate several models 
using three types of innovation variables with different income groups. Hypothesis 1 is 
supported because the securitization as a form of financial innovation variable has a strong 
positive effect on banking crisis for all types of country groups in Table 4. The result is 
consistent with Brunnermeier (2009) who argues that the originate-and-distribute model via 
securitization is one of the causes of the current crisis, and Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) 
who find that the securitization process causes several frictions such as moral hazard, adverse 
selection and principal-agent problems. This result is also consistent with the fact that most 
securitization is related to mortgages which are originated from banks. Based on the 
standardized regression coefficient, the expected count of the banking crisis in high income 
countries increases by 1.4308 and by 4.5697 for low income countries, for a standard 
deviation increase in securitization to GDP variable. This result indicates that regulators 
should be in control of the extent of securitization to contain the banking crisis. On the other 
hand, the securitization variable has negative effect on the currency crisis in all countries 
group because most international investors tend to invest in local currency and are able to 
reduce the exposure to currency risk (IFC 2008). 
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Table 4 shows that the interest rate derivatives variable has negative effects on the 
banking crisis for both high income and low income countries. The interest derivatives are 
applied as a hedging device for long-term loans and a tool for managing exposure to interest 
rate risk in banking industries, so it is likely to stabilize banking sector (Gropp et al. 2007). 
However, the derivatives variable does not have significant relation with the currency crisis 
because the underlying assets of the derivatives are in general independent of the changes in 
currency or exchange rate. On the other hand, the venture capital is strongly positively 
related to the banking crisis in high income countries. This result suggests that most venture 
capital and private equity herd into high risk activities in large economies and venture capital 
firms, especially in Europe, tend to obtain their funds from banks (Bottazzi et al. 2002, 
Wright et al. 2005). The standardized coefficient of the variable is large at 1.5908 for the 
banking crisis in high income countries. 
5.2 Effects of Regulations on Financial Crisis 
5.2.1 Effects of individual regulatory and supervisory variables 
To test Hypothesis 2 of the effects of financial regulations, I include two variables−overall 
restrictions on bank activities and entry requirements−of regulations as well as other five 
variables for different types of dependent variable with different income groups (Table 4). 
Hypothesis 2 stands because two regulations have negative effect on the banking crisis for all 
types of country groups. The result is different from Barth et al. (2004) and Beck et al. (2006) 
who show that restrictions on bank activities and entry barriers to foreign bank have positive 
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effects on banking crisis. The outcome suggests that stronger regulations in the form of 
restrictions on bank activities and entry requirements are positively associated with the 
financial stability. Effects of each regulation as well as other five regulations are followings. 
(a) Overall Restrictions on Bank Activities: In terms of the currency crisis, I do not find 
any significant relation between the overall restrictions on bank activities and the crisis for all 
countries group and high income countries; however, the restrictions present limited negative 
associations with the crisis for low income countries. This result is consistent with the view 
that tightened restrictions on bank activities prompt the soundness of banking industry (Boyd 
et al. 1998, John et al. 1994) because the potential causes of currency crisis include weak 
banking sector (Obstfeld 1994). Regarding the banking crisis, the restrictions have negative 
relation with the crisis only for high income countries. This result is different from Barth et 
al. (2004 and 2006) and Kroszner and Rajan (1994) who argue that intensifying regulatory 
restrictions on bank activities increases banking-system fragility. Apart from different data 
used in this study, this discrepancy may be explained by the fact that the current crisis is 
different from previous crises in that the excessive financial innovation plays a key role in 
the recent global crisis with contagion effects. For instance, when a bank, which participates 
in both banking and insurance, face idiosyncratic liquidity risk and hedge this risk using 
financial innovation such as credit risk transfer instruments in an interbank market, credit risk 
transfer can lead to contagion between banking and insurance parts and increase the risk 
(Allen and Carletti 2006).  
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(b) Entry requirements: The regulation is negatively associated with the banking crisis 
for all types of country group. This result suggests that fostering competition in banking 
industries or allowing less capable entrants might cause a banking crisis regardless of income 
level of a country. The result is consistent with the argument that big hurdle for the entry 
prompts the soundness of banking industry (Keeley 1990), but different from the claim that 
strict entry requirements hamper efficient competition and negatively affect economy 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1998). On the other hand, Barth et al. (2006) do not find any significant 
relation in their 2004 study.  
(c) Diversification: Diversification has different relations with the currency and 
banking crisis. The diversification index has strong negative relations with the currency crisis 
for all countries group and low income countries, whereas it has positive associations with 
the banking crisis for all types of country group. This result is consistent with the argument 
that banks are exposed to various risks with the greater diversification (Stigum 1990), but 
different from Barth et al. (2004) who find a negative relation between the banking crisis and 
the diversification in small economies and Busch et al (2004) who claim that greater 
diversification has a negative relation with banking crisis. In terms of the negative effect on 
the currency crisis, banks make loans from foreign investors for local currency financing for 
the liability diversification; therefore, they can reduce the exposure to currency risk (IFC 
2008). Regarding the positive effect on the banking crisis, banks usually securitize their 
mortgages and sell them for the asset diversification. However, the toxic waste is usually 
remained in the issuing banks and the waste can result in huge losses (Brunnermeier 2009). 
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The size of standardized coefficient is also relatively large in all regressions on the banking 
crisis, namely 1.5286 in high income countries, and 1.6259 in low income countries. 
(d) Capital regulation: The capital regulation is important regarding the Basel II 
Capital Accord which was implemented in most countries around 2008. For bank stability or 
efficiency, the Accord recommends countries to strengthen the capital regulation, official 
supervisory power, and the private monitoring. The capital regulation retains strong negative 
association only with the currency crisis of low income countries. Barth et al. do not find any 
association between them in their studies (2004, 2006, and 2008a). This may support the 
argument that the regulation enhances the financial stability by protecting the financial 
system from bank runs on illiquid banks (Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, Berger et al. 1995) 
because weak banking sector and bank runs are common factors of currency crises.  
(e) Private monitoring: While the third pillar of Basel II recommends empowering the 
private monitoring for the bank stability, Barth et al. find no association between the private 
monitoring and crisis. This study also does not find any significant association between 
private monitoring and the banking crisis. However, the private monitoring is negatively 
associated with the currency crisis for all countries group and high income countries, whereas 
it has a positive relation with the currency crisis among low income countries. One of the 
common causes of the currency crisis is the asymmetric information, and greater private 
monitoring which prompts more transparent disclosures, auditing, and rating tends to prevent 
high income countries from speculative attacks. However, the effectiveness of the private 
monitoring in low income countries has been a continuous issue in policy debate. Some 
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argue that market discipline is forward-looking, flexible, adaptive, and nonbureaucratic, 
while official oversight is usually rule-based, bureaucratic, and slow to change (Herring 
2004). Others claim that countries with poorly developed capital markets, accounting 
standards, and legal systems, benefit from official supervision since increased trust in the 
private monitoring in weak institutional environments results in exploitation of small savers 
and much less financial development (Barth et al. 2006). The result supports the latter 
argument. Greater private monitoring in weak institutional settings where a few people 
possess important information tends to result in condition of asymmetric information 
inducing the currency crisis. The standardized coefficient of the private monitoring is large in 
the regression on the currency crisis among low income countries, namely 1.1703. The result 
presents the poor financial environment for the private monitoring in low income countries 
and suggests that improving institutional environments for effective private monitoring can 
be the most important policy goal of currency crisis containment. 
(f) Government-owned banks and official supervisory power: The government 
ownership of banks has a positive effect on the banking crisis in high income countries but 
does not have any association in other models. This is consistent with the argument that 
higher government ownership of bank increases the likelihood of the banking crisis (Carprio 
and Peria 2006). The size of standardized coefficient is also large in the regression on the 
banking crisis with high income countries. On the other hand, although greater supervisory 
power is one of the recommendations of the Basel II Capital Accord, I find that the official 
supervisory power has a limited negative relation with the banking crisis in high income 
 
 38 
countries. In high income countries, the result is consistent with the contention that strong 
official supervisory power prevents the economy from market failures (Shleifer and Vishny 
1998). Barth et al. (2004 and 2006) do not find any significant relation regarding the 
regulation. 
5.2.2 Effects of regulatory combinations 
Particular regulatory combinations might have different outcomes due to their 
countervailing or amplifying effects. The effects are analyzed by adding interaction terms in 
the models; however, the result should be interpreted with care since the interaction term has 
to be taken into account to estimate a partial effect of each regulatory variable and some 
regulatory variables are transformed (Table 5). In the study, I analyze two interaction terms 
consisting of one of the individual regulations tested in Hypothesis 2. To test Hypothesis 3 on 
this effect of a regulatory combination of the restrictions on bank activities and the private 
monitoring, I add the interaction terms in the regression on the banking crisis for high income 
countries. The interaction term enters the regression with positive and significant coefficients, 
while two individual regulatory variables retain significantly negative relations with the 
crises. Hypothesis 3 is supported because the result shows that if the extent of one regulation 
is beyond a certain level, enhancing the other regulations cause a countervailing effect which 
reduces banking stability. For the models with the currency crisis as a dependent variable, the 
interaction term shows the same results for all countries group and high income countries. 
However, the result also indicate that enhanced restrictions on bank activities with weak 
private monitoring can still have a negative effect on financial crisis in high income countries. 
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The effect is consistent with Hypothesis 2 and, for the high income countries, with the 
contention that restricting bank activities is more important in weak institutional 
environments where the public sector lacks the ability to monitor banks. Regarding Barth et 
al.’s simulation (2008a), the result indicates that the effects of the regulatory combination in 
both Mexico and Korea depend on the relative degrees of both regulations. 
Some argue that restricting bank entry with weak official supervision results in banking 
stability (Barth et al. 2004); therefore, I analyze this argument adding the interaction term 
(official supervisory power * entry requirement) in each regression. I find a strong positive 
interaction term in the regression on the currency crisis among for low income countries, 
while individual regulatory variables enter the model with strongly negative and significant 
coefficient. The result is consistent with the argument regarding the currency crisis in low 
income countries. However, the result also suggests that the effects of the regulatory 
combination in low income countries depend on the relative degrees of both regulations and 
that more entry requirements with stronger official supervisory power can have 
countervailing effect precipitating the currency crisis in the countries. On the other hand, the 
results of both interaction terms suggest that some regulatory mixes of one of the three pillars 
of the Accord and other type of regulation can retain countervailing effect on financial crisis 




5.3 Controlled Variables 
Table 4 illustrates that the financial structure has a positive effect on the currency crisis for 
all countries group while it does not have any significant relation in other models. On the 
other hand, the bank-based structure has nothing to do with the banking crisis because the 
factors related to the current banking crisis are not bank-based structure; rather they are low 
interest rate, credit boom, asset bubble, and high leverage. While there is no relation between 
the M1 growth and the crises, M2 growth positively affects the banking crisis in all income 
level groups. This is consistent with the banking crisis since excessive liquidity is one 
possible cause of asset bubble associated with the current crisis. This implies that M2 is more 
accurate indicator of liquidity than M1. The standardized coefficients of M2 growth are also 
larger than any other significant variables in regression analyses, implying that the liquidity 
control is one of the most essential tools of avoiding banking crisis.  
The growth of commercial bank deposit is negatively associated with the currency 
crisis in high income countries and positively related with the crisis in low income countries. 
The variable is an indicator of capital inflow, and this result shows the inflow of large capital 
with speculative attacks in high income countries. On the other hand, in low income 
countries with pegged or fixed exchange rate, capital inflow is mostly from foreign direct 
investment and reduces the exposure to currency risk, and the standardized coefficient of the 
variable is the largest among all significant variables in the regression on the currency crisis 
in the low income countries. The growth of GDP per capita variable is positively associated 
with the banking crisis among low income countries and has the largest standardized 
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coefficient in the regression, while the national savings growth variable does not have any 






This study examines the effects of financial innovation and regulation on the current global 
crisis with a global dataset of 132 countries, and the effects are explored for different types of 
financial crises for countries with different income levels. The result suggests that financial 
innovation in the form of securitization has a negative effect on banking stability, while 
regulations and supervision in the form of restrictions on bank activities and entry 
requirements has a positive effect on the stability. However, when these two regulations are 
implemented together with one of the Basel II Capita Accord, such as the restrictions on bank 
activities with the private monitoring or the entry requirements with official supervisory 
power, these regulatory combinations can have negative effect on the stability in particular 
regulatory settings. The result suggests that some regulatory combinations can have 
countervailing effects on financial stability, and the effects depend on the extent of both 
regulations. 
The effects of other financial innovations or regulations depend on the type of crisis 
and the income level of a country. In terms of derivatives, it has a negative relation with the 
banking crisis in both high and low income countries. Venture capital is positively associated 
with the currency crisis for low income countries and has a strong positive relation with the 
banking crisis in high income countries. Regarding regulation and supervision, this study 
shows that diversification has strong negative relations with the currency crisis in both all 
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countries group and low income countries, while it has positive associations with the banking 
crisis in every income level group. Capital regulation has a strong negative association with 
the currency crisis in only low income countries. Private monitoring is associated with only 
currency crisis; however, the effects depend on the income level of a country. Private 
monitoring has a negative relation with the crisis in both all countries group and high income 
countries, while it has a positive association with the crisis in low income countries. 
Government ownership of banks has a positive relation with the banking crisis for only high 
income countries, while official supervisory power has a limited negative relation with the 
banking crisis for high income countries.  
Yet, this study has some limitations which need further studies. First, even though I 
remedy the problem of reverse causation by using 2005-6 regulatory data and 2007-9 crisis 
data, there might be a longer time lag between the implementation of the regulation and 
detectable effects in the financial sector. Moreover, contrary to the past crises, the banking 
crisis and the currency crisis have no correlation in the current crisis, and only banking crisis 
is the central in the current crisis. However, recent 2010 European debt crisis shows that 
there might be a time lag between banking crises and debt crises or between banking crises 
and currency crises because weak banking system and bank run are one of the common 
causes of the currency crisis. Second, the study shows that the effects of financial innovation 
and regulations on financial stability tend to depend on the income level of a country. In the 
study, countries are classified into only three groups, such as all countries group, high 
income countries, and low income countries. However, if future study applies more detailed 
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income classes with other regression models such as the threshold model for sample splitting, 
it can shed light on appropriate innovations and effective regulations according to the stage 
of economic development. Third, while I apply only three proxies to measure the extent of 
financial innovation, more sophisticated other indicators can present more accurate relation 
between financial innovation and crisis. For instance, foreign exchange swap or currency 
swap can shed light on detailed association between currency crisis and financial innovation. 
Fourth, a number of studies argue that financial fragility has a close relation with the 
generosity of deposit insurance, financial openness, legal origin, or degree of corruption; 
however, I cannot examine the associations due to the lack of worldwide data. Fifth, the 
regulatory variables focus on banking industry and do not cover other important financial 
sectors such as insurance industry, stock market, bond and money market, OTC derivatives 
markets, and foreign exchange market. Even though the banking industry is the most 
prominent of the financial sector and plays a key role in all financial services, current failures 
of institutions in other sectors such as AIG and Fannie Mae show that it is well worth 
examining regulations and supervisions of other financial sectors. Finally, the effectiveness 
of Basel II Accord is currently under debate, and this study also raises cautionary flag on its 
influence by exploring interaction terms. Most countries implemented the Accord around 
2008; therefore, further study on the effectiveness is required. 
Meanwhile, based on their simulations of banking crises, Barth et al. (2008a) argue that 
Mexico’s reform is more optimistic than Korea’s since Mexico enhanced the private 
monitoring and reduced the overall restrictions, while Korea reduced the private monitoring 
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and imposed greater restrictions. Interestingly, real count outcomes of the current crisis in 
this study are different since Korea is much below the average, while Mexico is above the 
average in terms of the banking crisis. This result is generally consistent with defined 
relations of the restrictions on bank activities in this study and also might show the 
significance of interactions among individual regulations. Therefore, regulators require the 




Figure 1: History of Financial Crises in Advanced and Emerging Economies (2007 – 
2009) 
 
Source: IMF (2009c) 
 
Figure 2: Trend of Banking Crisis during 2007 – 2009: Extensive Liquidity Support 
 


































Table 1: Description and source of variables 
Variable Unit Period Data source 
Financial crisis 
 Currency crisis Count 2007 - 2009 IMF (2009a) 
 Banking crisis Count 2007 - 2009 IMF (2009a, 2009b, 2009c), Pomerleano 
(2009), CGAP (2009) 
 Debt crisis Count 2007 - 2009 World Bank (2008, 2009b) 
 
Financial innovation 
 Securitization Percent 2006/2007 Europe Securitisation Forum (2008), 
International Financial Services London 
(2009), Deutsche Bank (2007), IFC(2008)  
 Derivatives Percent 2007 BIS (2007) 
 Venture capital Percent 2007 PWC (2008), LAVCA (2008), EVCA 




 Restrictions on bank activities Count 2006 Barth et al. (2008b) 
 Entry requirements Count 2006 Barth et al. (2008b) 
 Diversification Count 2006 Barth et al. (2008b) 
 Capital regulation Count 2006 Barth et al. (2008b) 
 Private monitoring Count 2006 Barth et al. (2008b) 
 Government-owned banks Percent 2006 Barth et al. (2008b) 
 Official supervisory power Count 2006 Barth et al. (2008b) 
 
Financial structure 
 Activity Ratio 2003-2007 Beck et al. (2009) 
 Size Ratio 2003-2007 Beck et al. (2009) 
 Efficiency Ratio 2003-2007 Beck et al. (2009) 
 Aggregated structure Index 2003-2007 Own calculation 
 
Macroeconomic variable 
 M1 growth % 2005-2006 IMF (2009a) 
 M2 growth % 2005-2006 IMF (2009a) 
 Commercial bank deposits % 2005-2006 IMF (2009a) 
 GDP per capita % 2005-2006 IMF (2009a) 






Table 2: Summary statistics of each variable (N = 132 countries) 
Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Financial crisis 
    Currency crisis 1.21 0.64 0.00 3.00
Banking crisis 2.84 4.05 0.00 17.00 
Debt crisis 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Financial innovation 
    Securitization  0.01 0.03 0.00 0.27
Derivatives  0.01 0.05 0.00 0.41 
Venture Capital  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 
Regulation 
    Restrictions on bank activities 10.77 2.24 4.00 16.00
Entry requirements 7.57 0.97 3.00 8.00 
Diversification 1.39 0.58 0.00 2.00 
Capital regulation 5.08 1.67 1.00 8.00 
Private monitoring 5.90 1.25 2.00 9.00 
Government-owned banks 0.16 0.22 0.00 0.94 
Official supervisory power 10.93 2.05 5.00 14.00 
Aggregated structure 0.00 1.00 -3.19 1.67 
Activity -2.66 2.31 -11.64 1.87 
Size -1.18 1.94 -7.27 1.82 
Efficiency -7.10 2.73 -17.64 -2.05 
Macroeconomic variable 
    M1 growth 0.19 0.18 -0.07 1.50
M2 growth 0.19 0.18 -0.51 0.89 
Commercial bank deposits 0.15 0.14 -0.02 0.72 
GDP per capita 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.33 
National savings growth -0.55 11.43 -105.94 51.50 
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Securitization  1.00 
               
Derivatives 0.28* 1.00 
              
Venture capital 0.22* 0.52* 1.00 
             Restrictions on 
bank activities† -0.19* -0.29* -0.27* 1.00 
            Entry 
requirements -0.03 0.03 -0.11 -0.11 1.00 
           
Diversification 
-0.05 0.09 0.12 -0.19* 0.07 1.00 
          Capital 
regulation 0.03 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.00 -0.12 1.00 
         Private 
monitoring† 0.25* 0.25* 0.35* -0.15 -0.09 0.07 0.10 1.00 
        Government-
owned banks† -0.14 -0.18* -0.21* 0.18* -0.17* -0.07 -0.09 -0.11 1.00 
       Official super-
visory power† 0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.24* 0.10 -0.05 -0.05 -0.11 -0.06 1.00 
      Aggregated 
structure 0.31* 0.28* 0.39* -0.23* -0.07 -0.02 0.23* 0.36* -0.20* 0.04 1.00 
     
M1 growth 
-0.17 -0.13 -0.13 0.18* -0.04 -0.07 -0.24* -0.21* 0.13 0.03 -0.23* 1.00 
    
M2 growth 
-0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 0.12 -0.08 0.04 -0.14 -0.05 -0.14 -0.04 0.04 1.00 
   Commercial 
bank deposits† 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.05 -0.01 -0.13 1.00 
  GDP per 
capita† -0.21* -0.19* -0.15 0.22* -0.04 -0.26* -0.14 -0.27* 0.22* -0.02 -0.12 0.57* 0.41* -0.03 1.00 
 National savings 
growth 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.13 -0.03 0.06 -0.08 0.02 0.13 -0.08 0.15 -0.12 0.07 -0.12 -0.09 1.00 
Notes: * p<0.05 
                  † Transformed variables 
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Table 4: Effects of innovations and regulations on crises  
 Currency crisis Banking crisis 
VARIABLES (C1) (C2) (C3) (B1) (B2) (B3) 
       
Securitization -2.63** -1.61 -18.37 7.33*** 9.43*** 685.29*** 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.77) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Derivatives -0.11 0.31 67.89 -2.68 -4.25** -2143.22*** 
 (0.86) (0.55) (0.71) (0.23) (0.04) (0.00) 
Venture capital -8.40 -7.68 59.06* 32.83 58.53*** -246.98 
 (0.24) (0.15) (0.08) (0.14) (0.01) (0.15) 
Restrictions on bank activities† -0.00 -0.00 -0.00* -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01** 
   (0.17) (0.19) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Entry requirements -0.05 -0.08 -0.13 -0.26** -0.38** -0.35* 
   (0.36) (0.19) (0.13) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) 
Diversification -0.21*** -0.13 -0.54*** 0.40* 0.77** 0.79** 
 (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) 
Capital regulation -0.03 -0.03 -0.15*** -0.05 -0.09 0.09 
   (0.29) (0.28) (0.00) (0.52) (0.45) (0.56) 
Private monitoring† -0.01* -0.02*** 0.01** -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 
   (0.08) (0.00) (0.03) (0.15) (0.17) (0.96) 
Government-owned banks† 0.06 -0.07 -0.07 0.41 1.69** -0.96 
   (0.73) (0.71) (0.80) (0.41) (0.01) (0.15) 
Official supervisory power† -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01* -0.00 
   (0.79) (0.64) (0.70) (0.12) (0.06) (0.53) 
Aggregated structure 0.10** -0.00 0.09 0.04 0.21 -0.14 
   (0.04) (0.99) (0.14) (0.80) (0.40) (0.55) 
M1 growth -0.30 -0.07 -0.87 0.62 1.57 -1.10 
 (0.36) (0.83) (0.27) (0.45) (0.29) (0.47) 
M2 growth 0.00 0.44 -0.06 1.94*** 2.08** 1.78*** 
 (1.00) (0.32) (0.90) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Commercial bank deposits† -0.00 -0.00** 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.01 
   (0.78) (0.03) (0.01) (0.87) (0.89) (0.36) 
GDP per capita† -0.70 -1.04 -1.86 -0.34 -2.30 5.36** 
 (0.29) (0.17) (0.17) (0.86) (0.51) (0.02) 
National savings growth -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.14 
   (0.29) (0.11) (0.77) (0.56) (0.79) (0.26) 
Constant 1.73*** 2.41*** 3.27*** 4.17*** 5.48*** 2.08 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.48) 
       
Observations 132 76 56 132 76 56 
Pseudo R-squared 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.12 
Log pseudolikelihood 
   
-155.2 -88.92 -60.79 -265.0 -155.7 -99.67 
 
Notes: P-values in parentheses under the coefficients are based on robust standard errors. 
            *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
                  † Transformed variables. 
            All countries: (C1), (B1); High income countries: (C2), (B2); Low income countries: (C3), (B3).   
 
 51 
Table 5: Effects of interactions of regulations on crises 
 Currency crisis Banking crisis 
VARIABLES (C1-1) (C2-1) (C3-1) (B2-1) 
     
Securitization -1.87** -1.50* -32.47 9.90*** 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.56) (0.00) 
Derivatives 0.40 0.64 130.86 -3.39* 
 (0.48) (0.24) (0.38) (0.09) 
Venture capital -3.41 -6.48 28.48 58.68*** 
 (0.57) (0.19) (0.42) (0.01) 
Restrictions on bank activities† -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00** -0.04*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) 
Entry requirements -0.09** -0.08 -1.44*** -0.38** 
   (0.04) (0.10) (0.00) (0.03) 
Diversification -0.27*** -0.20** -0.49*** 0.71** 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) 
Capital regulation -0.03 -0.04 -0.15*** -0.10 
   (0.21) (0.24) (0.00) (0.40) 
Private monitoring† -0.04*** -0.04*** 0.01*** -0.07** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) 
Government-owned banks† -0.02 -0.14 -0.16 1.47** 
   (0.92) (0.47) (0.59) (0.03) 
Official supervisory power† -0.00 -0.00 -0.07*** -0.01* 
   (0.61) (0.62) (0.00) (0.06) 
Aggregated structure 0.07* 0.00 0.10 0.20 
   (0.10) (0.97) (0.11) (0.42) 
M1 growth -0.37 -0.08 -0.76 1.78 
 (0.28) (0.82) (0.33) (0.21) 
M2 growth -0.07 0.40 -0.08 1.91** 
 (0.86) (0.39) (0.86) (0.03) 
Commercial bank deposits† -0.00 -0.00** 0.01** 0.00 
   (0.88) (0.03) (0.02) (0.80) 
GDP per capita† -0.60 -0.94 -2.02 -1.86 
 (0.30) (0.21) (0.13) (0.58) 
National savings growth -0.01 -0.00** 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.11) (0.03) (0.90) (0.77) 
Restrictions on bank activities† 0.00*** 0.00**  0.00* 
  * Private monitoring† (0.00) (0.02)  (0.07) 
Entry requirements   0.01***  
  * Official supervisory power†   (0.00)  
     
Constant 3.37*** 3.31*** 13.36*** 7.54*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
Observations 132 76 56 76 
Pseudo R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.08 
Log pseudolikelihood -153.3 -88.34 -60.16 -154.6 
Notes: P-values in parentheses under the coefficients are based on robust standard errors. 
            *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
                  † Transformed variables. 
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